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AI Implementation feature(823): Landing Page and Login/Register Modal (#11)

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This commit was merged in pull request #11.
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m0rph3us1987
2026-07-21 18:34:45 +00:00
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commit 685a8bca84
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docs/api/admin.md
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---
type: api
title: Admin Endpoints
description: User management endpoints mounted under /api/v1/admin (admin role required).
tags: [api, admin, users]
timestamp: 2026-07-21T18:28:00Z
---
# Endpoints
| Method | Path | Auth | Source |
|---------|-----------------------|---------|-----------------------------------------------------|
| `GET` | `/api/v1/admin/users` | Admin | `backend/src/modules/admin/admin.controller.ts` |
| `POST` | `/api/v1/admin/users` | Admin | Same. |
| `PATCH` | `/api/v1/admin/users/:id` | Admin | Same. |
| `DELETE`| `/api/v1/admin/users/:id` | Admin | Same. |
# Guard chain
1. `JwtAuthGuard` (global) validates the access token unless the handler
is `@Public()`. Admin handlers are not.
2. `AdminGuard` (`backend/src/common/guards/admin.guard.ts`) requires
`req.user.role === 'admin'`.
# Behavior
* `AdminService` enforces the **last-admin invariant** (`LAST_ADMIN` /
`409`) — the final admin row cannot be demoted or deleted.
* `POST /api/v1/admin/users` creates a new user; `PATCH /api/v1/admin/users/:id`
changes role / status; `DELETE /api/v1/admin/users/:id` removes the row.
# See also
- [Backend Module Map](/architecture/backend-modules.md)
- [Admin Shell & User Management](/guides/admin-shell.md)
- [REST API Overview](/api/rest-overview.md)
docs/api/auth.md
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---
type: api
title: Auth Endpoints
description: Login, refresh, logout, public self-registration, CSRF, and first-admin registration.
tags: [api, auth, login, register, refresh, csrf]
timestamp: 2026-07-21T18:28:00Z
---
# Endpoints
| Method | Path | Auth | CSRF | Rate limited | Source |
|--------|-----------------------------------|--------|-----------------------------------------------|--------------|--------|
| `POST` | `/api/v1/auth/register` | `@Public()` | Enforced — caller must first call `GET /api/v1/auth/csrf` (the SPA's `AuthService.ensureCsrf()` does this automatically). | Yes — `RegistrationRateLimitService` per IP | `backend/src/modules/auth/auth.controller.ts` |
| `POST` | `/api/v1/auth/login` | `@Public()` | Enforced — same pattern as `register`. CSRF skip was removed in this change. | Yes — `LoginBackoffService` per IP + username | `backend/src/modules/auth/auth.controller.ts` |
| `POST` | `/api/v1/auth/refresh` | Public route, requires a valid refresh cookie. | Skipped (the request is a `POST` carrying an HttpOnly cookie, not a state-changing user action). | No | `backend/src/modules/auth/auth.controller.ts` |
| `POST` | `/api/v1/auth/logout` | Authenticated (JWT). | Enforced. | No | `backend/src/modules/auth/auth.controller.ts` |
| `GET` | `/api/v1/auth/csrf` | `@Public()` | n/a (`GET`). | No | `backend/src/modules/auth/auth.controller.ts` |
| `POST` | `/api/v1/auth/register-first-admin` | `@Public()` | Skipped (path is in `CsrfMiddleware.SKIP_PATH_PREFIXES`). | Yes | `backend/src/modules/users/users.controller.ts` |
# Public player self-registration — `POST /api/v1/auth/register`
New endpoint, gated by the `registrationsEnabled` setting
(`backend/src/config/env.schema.ts` → `SETTINGS_KEYS.REGISTRATIONS_ENABLED`,
default `"false"`).
| Field | Type | Constraints |
|-------------------|--------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| `username` | string | 3–32 chars, regex `^[a-zA-Z0-9_.-]+$` |
| `password` | string | 1–256 chars; also passes `validatePassword` (Argon2 policy). |
| `passwordConfirm` | string | Must equal `password` (zod refine → `VALIDATION_FAILED` on `passwordConfirm`). |
Validated by `backend/src/modules/auth/dto/auth.dto.ts` → `RegisterDtoSchema`.
## Successful response (201)
```json
{
"accessToken": "<jwt>",
"expiresIn": 900,
"user": { "id": "<uuid>", "username": "player1", "role": "player" }
}
```
The refresh token is set as an `HttpOnly` cookie via `setRefreshCookie(res, session.refreshToken, config)`. The new `user` row has `role='player'` and `status='enabled'`.
## Error envelope
| HTTP | `code` | When |
|------|-------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 400 | `VALIDATION_FAILED` | zod body validation failed. |
| 400 | `WEAK_PASSWORD` | Argon2 policy rejects the password. |
| 403 | `REGISTRATIONS_DISABLED`| `setting.registrationsEnabled !== 'true'`. |
| 409 | `USERNAME_TAKEN` | A user with that username already exists. |
| 429 | `RATE_LIMITED` | `RegistrationRateLimitService` blocked the IP. |
## Wiring
* `AuthService.registerPlayer(dto, ip)` runs inside a single
`DataSource.transaction`:
1. `RegistrationRateLimitService.isAllowed(ip)` check.
2. `SettingsService.get(SETTINGS_KEYS.REGISTRATIONS_ENABLED, 'false')` check.
3. Username uniqueness lookup → `USERNAME_TAKEN` on collision.
4. Argon2id hash + insert `UserEntity({ role: 'player', status: 'enabled' })`.
5. `RegistrationRateLimitService.record(ip)`.
6. `mintSession(manager, user)` → access JWT + refresh row.
# Frontend consumer
`frontend/src/app/core/services/auth.service.ts` exposes `login()` and
`register()`. Both:
1. Call `ensureCsrf()` → `GET /api/v1/auth/csrf` to materialise the `csrf`
cookie if it isn't set yet (failures are swallowed because the
`CsrfMiddleware` will mint the cookie on the next response anyway).
2. `POST` with `{ withCredentials: true, observe: 'response' }`.
3. Return a discriminated union:
* `{ ok: true, accessToken, expiresIn, user }` on success.
* `{ ok: false, status, code, message }` on failure, built by the
private `mapAuthError()` helper from the standard
[error envelope](/api/rest-overview.md).
The `LandingComponent` (`frontend/src/app/features/landing/landing.component.ts`)
consumes both methods and maps the `code` to user-facing copy via
`buildLoginFailureMessage` (see [Landing Page](/guides/landing-page.md)).
# See also
- [REST API Overview](/api/rest-overview.md)
- [Setup Endpoint](/api/setup.md)
- [Landing Page Guide](/guides/landing-page.md)
docs/api/rest-overview.md
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title: REST API Overview
description: Base URL, versioning, auth, CSRF, and the standard error envelope.
tags: [api, rest, overview, csrf]
timestamp: 2026-07-21T14:43:00Z
timestamp: 2026-07-21T18:28:00Z
---
# Base URL & versioning
@@ -40,8 +40,11 @@ prefix; the SPA fallback only kicks in for non-API routes.
* Skip list (`SKIP_PATH_PREFIXES` in
`backend/src/common/middleware/csrf.middleware.ts`):
- `/api/v1/auth/register-first-admin`
- `/api/v1/auth/login`
- `/api/v1/setup/create-admin`
- `/api/v1/auth/login` is **no longer** skipped — the middleware still
mints the cookie on the first response, and the SPA's
`AuthService.login`/`AuthService.register` first call `GET /api/v1/auth/csrf`
via `ensureCsrf()` to materialise the cookie before submitting.
# Error envelope
@@ -73,7 +76,8 @@ endpoint). Full list lives in `backend/src/common/errors/error-codes.ts`:
`VALIDATION_FAILED`, `UNAUTHORIZED`, `FORBIDDEN`, `NOT_FOUND`,
`CONFLICT`, `LAST_ADMIN`, `SYSTEM_INITIALIZED`, `RATE_LIMITED`,
`CSRF_INVALID`, `WEAK_PASSWORD`, `USERNAME_TAKEN`,
`INVALID_CREDENTIALS`, `TOKEN_REVOKED`, `THEME_INVALID`, `INTERNAL`.
`INVALID_CREDENTIALS`, `TOKEN_REVOKED`, `THEME_INVALID`,
`REGISTRATIONS_DISABLED`, `INTERNAL`.
# See also
docs/api/system.md
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---
type: api
title: System Endpoints
description: Bootstrap payload, event status, and SSE streams.
tags: [api, system, bootstrap, event, sse]
timestamp: 2026-07-21T18:28:00Z
---
# Endpoints
| Method | Path | Auth | Source |
|--------|---------------------------------|--------|-----------------------------------------------------|
| `GET` | `/api/v1/bootstrap` | Public | `backend/src/modules/system/system.controller.ts` |
| `GET` | `/api/v1/event/status` | Public | Same. |
| `GET` | `/api/v1/event/stream` | Public (SSE) | Same. |
| `GET` | `/api/v1/scoreboard/stream` | Public (SSE) | Same. |
# `GET /api/v1/bootstrap`
Built by `SystemService.bootstrap()`. Public payload consumed by the
SPA's `BootstrapService`:
```json
{
"initialized": true,
"pageTitle": "HIPCTF",
"logo": "",
"welcomeMarkdown": "# Welcome\n\n...",
"theme": { "id": "classic", "tokens": { "...": "..." } },
"defaultChallengeIp": "127.0.0.1",
"registrationsEnabled": false
}
```
* `initialized` is `true` iff at least one admin user exists.
* `theme` is the resolved `Theme` (one of the 10 canonical themes; see
[Theming](/guides/theming.md)).
* `registrationsEnabled` is read from the `setting` table
(`SETTINGS_KEYS.REGISTRATIONS_ENABLED`) and gates the new public
register endpoint (see [Auth Endpoints](/api/auth.md)).
# `GET /api/v1/event/status`
Returns the current event window computed by `EventStatusService`:
```json
{ "state": "Running", "countdownMs": 12345, "startUtc": "...", "endUtc": "..." }
```
`state` is `Stopped` when `now < eventStartUtc` (countdown), `Running`
between start and end, and `Stopped` once `now >= eventEndUtc`.
# SSE streams
* `/api/v1/event/stream` — emits the same payload as
`GET /api/v1/event/status` whenever `SseHubService.publish` is invoked
(typically via an admin cron tick).
* `/api/v1/scoreboard/stream` — emits the public scoreboard projection
after each new solve.
Both use NestJS `@Sse()` and are proxied through `SseHubService`
(`backend/src/common/services/sse-hub.service.ts`).
# See also
- [Auth and Settings Tables](/database/auth-settings.md)
- [Theming](/guides/theming.md)
- [Event Window](/guides/event-window.md)
- [Scoreboard Stream](/guides/scoreboard-stream.md)
docs/api/uploads.md
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---
type: api
title: Uploads Endpoints
description: Admin-only multipart upload endpoints for category icons and challenge files.
tags: [api, uploads, multipart, admin]
timestamp: 2026-07-21T18:28:00Z
---
# Endpoints
| Method | Path | Auth | Source |
|--------|---------------------------------------|-------|---------------------------------------------------------|
| `POST` | `/api/v1/uploads/category-icon` | Admin | `backend/src/modules/uploads/uploads.controller.ts` |
| `POST` | `/api/v1/uploads/challenge-file` | Admin | Same. |
# Guard chain
Both handlers are gated by `JwtAuthGuard` + `AdminGuard`. CSRF is enforced
(standard cookie + header pattern; nothing is added to the skip list).
# Behavior
* Each endpoint uses `FileInterceptor('file')` and parses a single
multipart part named `file`.
* File size is validated by `parseUploadSizeLimit()` in
`backend/src/common/utils/upload.ts`.
* Filenames are sanitized by the same helper before being persisted
under `UPLOAD_DIR`.
# See also
- [REST API Overview](/api/rest-overview.md)
- [Backend Module Map](/architecture/backend-modules.md)